A federal judge has just ruled that the health care mandate (and related provisions) are unconstitutional and exceed the feds' powers under the commerce clause - nor, apparently, did the late hour argument that it is a "tax" prove persuasive.
Wonder how much more of the tribute paid by some of us will be spent to decide how much more tribute should be confiscated from some of us to be redistributed to others?
Of course the answer will be decided by the philosophical and collectivist ambitions of the courts and not by the legitimacy nor the efficacy of the regulation.
Showing posts with label federal government. Show all posts
Showing posts with label federal government. Show all posts
Monday, December 13, 2010
Friday, November 19, 2010
Election in the Rear View
Two weeks gone by and the outcome of the election is starting to come into focus.
I really had hoped that there would be a significant mandate for the Tea Party and its candidates...not that there wasn't an effect...the Tea Party raised the level of change from that of a typical mid-term election to historic numbers.
Unfortunately, the real impact was a bit muted by the fact that the few truly outstanding, consistently conservative candidates mostly lost and nearly all of the hard-core statists won. Most of the changes occurred in the middle where dozens of moderate dems were defeated by dozens of moderate republicans.
The result is that Nancy Pelosi has a smaller but more cohesive leftist bloc and the republican majority is still lacking the necessary fire and steel needed for a revolutionary term.
What needs to be understood here is that the outcome of the congressional elections are nearly meaningless: no vetos can be overidden, no legislation can be passed (without compromise), there will be gridlock.
If the President was a normal politician this would be a good position for the people's sake. But, sadly, the chief executive is not a normal politician.
The fact that all the republicans can do is say no leaves the nation virtually naked in the face of the bureaucratic onslaught we are about to experience.
Obama will now begin to show his true statist colors and rule by fiat through executive orders and regulation - and the republicans can't stop him.
How do we counter this War of Federal Aggression? Two ways: through our state and local governments and by our refusal to participate in the system.
I really had hoped that there would be a significant mandate for the Tea Party and its candidates...not that there wasn't an effect...the Tea Party raised the level of change from that of a typical mid-term election to historic numbers.
Unfortunately, the real impact was a bit muted by the fact that the few truly outstanding, consistently conservative candidates mostly lost and nearly all of the hard-core statists won. Most of the changes occurred in the middle where dozens of moderate dems were defeated by dozens of moderate republicans.
The result is that Nancy Pelosi has a smaller but more cohesive leftist bloc and the republican majority is still lacking the necessary fire and steel needed for a revolutionary term.
What needs to be understood here is that the outcome of the congressional elections are nearly meaningless: no vetos can be overidden, no legislation can be passed (without compromise), there will be gridlock.
If the President was a normal politician this would be a good position for the people's sake. But, sadly, the chief executive is not a normal politician.
The fact that all the republicans can do is say no leaves the nation virtually naked in the face of the bureaucratic onslaught we are about to experience.
Obama will now begin to show his true statist colors and rule by fiat through executive orders and regulation - and the republicans can't stop him.
How do we counter this War of Federal Aggression? Two ways: through our state and local governments and by our refusal to participate in the system.
Labels:
elections,
evil,
federal government,
freedom,
obama
Thursday, August 5, 2010
So a solitary judge in California overturned an expensive and divisive constitutional amendment...is anyone really surprised? His being a homosexual had nothing to do with his ruling, though, well not a lot.
This opinion now means a whole lot of money will be given to attorneys to do a lot of meaningless legal work (maybe they can get stimulus funds)and bunch of sweet, loving gays and lesbians can spend their boundless energy attacking and villifying people who dare to have an opinion and even more religious folk can fill the airwaves with senseless drivel about how the state licensing non-traditional marriage will destroy the moral fiber of the nation.
Well I call bullshit.
The judge made a correct ruling - probably for the wrong reasons, but correct.
Why, you may ask.
Because marriage licenses are issued by the state and the state makes the rules. Therefore, if the state wants to license same-sex marriage, it can. If the state wants to license polygamy, it can. If the state wants to enable NAMBLA's desires, it can and it probably will in the not too distant future.
Both sides of the conflict are populated by idiots - complete and cognitively defective idiots.
Why does anyone want the government, at any level, to decide and regulate and license who can marry who?
If either the pro or con side had spent any time in deep thought (and knew anything about history)they would be demanding the state get out of the marriage business.
Same-sex marriage will not bring the nation to ruin, it is a symptom of the ruin that already occurred because we made the state a god and forgot the real one.
This opinion now means a whole lot of money will be given to attorneys to do a lot of meaningless legal work (maybe they can get stimulus funds)and bunch of sweet, loving gays and lesbians can spend their boundless energy attacking and villifying people who dare to have an opinion and even more religious folk can fill the airwaves with senseless drivel about how the state licensing non-traditional marriage will destroy the moral fiber of the nation.
Well I call bullshit.
The judge made a correct ruling - probably for the wrong reasons, but correct.
Why, you may ask.
Because marriage licenses are issued by the state and the state makes the rules. Therefore, if the state wants to license same-sex marriage, it can. If the state wants to license polygamy, it can. If the state wants to enable NAMBLA's desires, it can and it probably will in the not too distant future.
Both sides of the conflict are populated by idiots - complete and cognitively defective idiots.
Why does anyone want the government, at any level, to decide and regulate and license who can marry who?
If either the pro or con side had spent any time in deep thought (and knew anything about history)they would be demanding the state get out of the marriage business.
Same-sex marriage will not bring the nation to ruin, it is a symptom of the ruin that already occurred because we made the state a god and forgot the real one.
Labels:
authority,
Christianity,
faith,
federal government,
government
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Financial Regulation
"There will be no more tax-funded bailouts, period."
Technically, barring something unanticipated, President Obama told the truth when he said this today. If he could have left it there, he could have remained in truth...alas, he could not:
"Because of this law, the American people will never be asked again to foot the bill for Wall Street's mistakes,"
See, this statement is patently untrue. Is it a lie - who knows? Whether it is deception or ignorance, it is a false statement.
In order to see why it is false, we must examine how the regulation intends to deal with the possible (likely) failures in the future. The plan, in short, is to charge a fee (tax) to the banks which will be placed in a fund (haha, yeah, right...like social security and the highway fund). The fund will be used to deal with any financial failures which occur.
Now here comes the unspoken truth: where does the money actually come from?
Well the banks and financial institutions, of course. Right?
Wrong!
Self-evident truth of economics #1: businesses pay no taxes (fees, assessments, tribute). Businesses only collect taxes (etc.).
The way it works is that a business intends to make a profit. Now, since in the most basic sense, profit exists only when revenue exceeds expenses, if a business' costs increase, in order to stay profitable, it will have to increase its prices. (Of course there are other factors which could prevent the price increase, but lets set that discussion aside for the moment.)
A bank is a business which is organized to make a profit, therefore, if the bank is taxed or charged a fee, it will pass that cost on to the customer through increased prices.
Thus, the bailouts of the future will still be paid for by the American people - there just won't be a TARP to act as a lightning rod for public scorn (at least not at first).
Oh, by the way, the price increases passed to the consumer will be regressive, that is, the extra costs will cause greater harm to those with the least assets. If you want to know how that works, ask me.
This is just one of the problems with this legislation, but let's save them for another day.
Technically, barring something unanticipated, President Obama told the truth when he said this today. If he could have left it there, he could have remained in truth...alas, he could not:
"Because of this law, the American people will never be asked again to foot the bill for Wall Street's mistakes,"
See, this statement is patently untrue. Is it a lie - who knows? Whether it is deception or ignorance, it is a false statement.
In order to see why it is false, we must examine how the regulation intends to deal with the possible (likely) failures in the future. The plan, in short, is to charge a fee (tax) to the banks which will be placed in a fund (haha, yeah, right...like social security and the highway fund). The fund will be used to deal with any financial failures which occur.
Now here comes the unspoken truth: where does the money actually come from?
Well the banks and financial institutions, of course. Right?
Wrong!
Self-evident truth of economics #1: businesses pay no taxes (fees, assessments, tribute). Businesses only collect taxes (etc.).
The way it works is that a business intends to make a profit. Now, since in the most basic sense, profit exists only when revenue exceeds expenses, if a business' costs increase, in order to stay profitable, it will have to increase its prices. (Of course there are other factors which could prevent the price increase, but lets set that discussion aside for the moment.)
A bank is a business which is organized to make a profit, therefore, if the bank is taxed or charged a fee, it will pass that cost on to the customer through increased prices.
Thus, the bailouts of the future will still be paid for by the American people - there just won't be a TARP to act as a lightning rod for public scorn (at least not at first).
Oh, by the way, the price increases passed to the consumer will be regressive, that is, the extra costs will cause greater harm to those with the least assets. If you want to know how that works, ask me.
This is just one of the problems with this legislation, but let's save them for another day.
Labels:
bank regulation,
banks,
economy,
federal government,
finanacial regulation,
obama
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
News Surfing
Just a couple of quick notes based on news surfing the past few days:
1. Deepwater Horizon - the leak will be used to impose and/or pass environmental legislation to "prevent" similar disasters and make the oil companies pay for the safety and there will be much talk about dependency on foreign oil. Remember that corporations do NOT pay taxes. Business are tax collectors...their customers pay the taxes through price increases. Can you say $5.00 gas?
2. Climate Change - look for the cooling trend of the past decade to be accepted as fact and the discussion slowly start to turn toward global cooling (as evidence of man affecting the environment). Never mind the increasing activity of the sun and the solar flares headed here (or the reversal of the temperature trend therefrom). We all know man affects climate, not the sun.
3. Election - nothing yet has changed my hunch that the Republican landslide will fizzle. Politics are local and, even now, most will keep their guy. Still watching for trends.
1. Deepwater Horizon - the leak will be used to impose and/or pass environmental legislation to "prevent" similar disasters and make the oil companies pay for the safety and there will be much talk about dependency on foreign oil. Remember that corporations do NOT pay taxes. Business are tax collectors...their customers pay the taxes through price increases. Can you say $5.00 gas?
2. Climate Change - look for the cooling trend of the past decade to be accepted as fact and the discussion slowly start to turn toward global cooling (as evidence of man affecting the environment). Never mind the increasing activity of the sun and the solar flares headed here (or the reversal of the temperature trend therefrom). We all know man affects climate, not the sun.
3. Election - nothing yet has changed my hunch that the Republican landslide will fizzle. Politics are local and, even now, most will keep their guy. Still watching for trends.
Labels:
BP,
climate change,
elections,
environment,
federal government,
global warming,
gulf,
news,
obama,
United States. society
Thursday, May 20, 2010
Is It Intentional?
The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty
The theory here, to force change through chaos, was among the most provocative of the 1960s.
by Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven
From the Monday, May 2, 1966 issue of The Nation
How can the poor be organized to press for relief from poverty? How can a broad-based movement be developed and the current disarray of activist forces be halted? These questions confront, and confound, activists today. It is our purpose to advance a strategy which affords the basis for a convergence of civil rights organizations, militant anti-poverty groups and the poor. If this strategy were implemented, a political crisis would result that could lead to legislation for a guaranteed annual income and thus an end to poverty.
The strategy is based on the fact that a vast discrepancy exists between the benefits to which people are entitled under public welfare programs and the sums which they actually receive. This gulf is not recognized in a society that is wholly and self-righteously oriented toward getting people off the welfare rolls. It is widely known, for example, that nearly 8 million persons (half of them white) now subsist on welfare, but it is not generally known that for every person on the rolls at least one more probably meets existing criteria of eligibility but is not obtaining assistance.
The discrepancy is not an accident stemming from bureaucratic inefficiency; rather, it is an integral feature of the welfare system which, if challenged, would precipitate a profound financial and political crisis. The force for that challenge, and the strategy we propose, is a massive drive to recruit the poor onto the welfare rolls.
The distribution of public assistance has been a local and state responsibility, and that accounts in large part for the abysmal character of welfare practices. Despite the growing involvement of federal agencies in supervisory and reimbursement arrangements, state and local community forces are still decisive. The poor are most visible and proximate in the local community; antagonism toward them (and toward the agencies which are implicated with them) has always, therefore, been more intense locally than at the federal level. In recent years, local communities have increasingly felt class and ethnic friction generated by competition for neighborhoods, schools, jobs and political power. Public welfare systems are under the constant stress of conflict and opposition, made only sharper by the rising costs to localities of public aid. And, to accommodate this pressure, welfare practice everywhere has become more restrictive than welfare statute; much of the time it verges on lawlessness. Thus, public welfare systems try to keep their budgets down and their rolls low by failing to inform people of the rights available to them; by intimidating and shaming them to the degree that they are reluctant either to apply or to press claims, and by arbitrarily denying benefits to those who are eligible.
A series of welfare drives in large cities would, we believe, impel action on a new federal program to distribute income, eliminating the present public welfare system and alleviating the abject poverty which it perpetrates. Widespread campaigns to register the eligible poor for welfare aid, and to help existing recipients obtain their full benefits, would produce bureaucratic disruption in welfare agencies and fiscal disruption in local and state governments. These disruptions would generate severe political strains, and deepen existing divisions among elements in the big-city Democratic coalition: the remaining white middle class, the white working-class ethnic groups and the growing minority poor. To avoid a further weakening of that historic coalition, a national Democratic administration would be con-strained to advance a federal solution to poverty that would override local welfare failures, local class and racial conflicts and local revenue dilemmas. By the internal disruption of local bureaucratic practices, by the furor over public welfare poverty, and by the collapse of current financing arrangements, powerful forces can be generated for major economic reforms at the national level.
The ultimate objective of this strategy--to wipe out poverty by establishing a guaranteed annual income--will be questioned by some. Because the ideal of individual social and economic mobility has deep roots, even activists seem reluctant to call for national programs to eliminate poverty by the outright redistribution of income. Instead, programs are demanded to enable people to become economically competitive. But such programs are of no use to millions of today's poor. For example, one-third of the 35 million poor Americans are in families headed by females; these heads of family cannot be aided appreciably by job retraining, higher minimum wages, accelerated rates of economic growth, or employment in public works projects. Nor can the 5 million aged who are poor, nor those whose poverty results from the ill health of the wage earner. Programs to enhance individual mobility will chiefly benefit the very young, if not the as yet unborn. Individual mobility is no answer to the question of how to abolish the massive problem of poverty now.
It has never been the full answer. If many people in the past have found their way up from poverty by the path of individual mobility, many others have taken a different route. Organized labor stands out as a major example. Although many American workers never yielded their dreams of individual achievement, they accepted and practiced the principle that each can benefit only as the status of workers as a whole is elevated. They bargained for collective mobility, not for individual mobility; to promote their fortunes in the aggregate, not to promote the prospects of one worker over another. And if each finally found himself in the same relative economic relationship to his fellows as when he began, it was nevertheless clear that all were infinitely better off. That fact has sustained the labor movement in the face of a counter pull from the ideal of individual achievement.
But many of the contemporary poor will not rise from poverty by organizing to bargain collectively. They either are not in the labor force or are In such marginal and dispersed occupations (e.g., domestic servants) that it is extremely difficult to organize them. Compared with other groups, then, many of today's poor cannot secure a redistribution of income by organizing within the institution of private enterprise. A federal program of income redistribution has become necessary to elevate the poor en masse from poverty.
Several ways have been proposed for redistributing income through the federal government. It is not our purpose here to assess the relative merits of these plans, which are still undergoing debate and clarification. Whatever mechanism is eventually adopted, however, it must include certain features if it is not merely to perpetuate in a new guise the present evils of the public welfare system.
First, adequate levels of income must be assured. (Public welfare levels are astonishingly low; indeed, states typically define a "minimum" standard of living and then grant only a percentage of it, so that families are held well below what the government itself officially defines as the poverty level.) Furthermore, income should be distributed without requiring that recipients first divest themselves of their assets, as public welfare now does, thereby pauperizing families as a condition of sustenance.
Second, the right to income must be guaranteed, or the oppression of the welfare poor will not be eliminated. Because benefits are conditional under the present public welfare system, submission to arbitrary governmental power is regularly made the price of sustenance. People have been coerced into attending literacy classes or participating in medical or vocational rehabilitation regimes, on pain of having their benefits terminated. Men are forced into labor on virtually any terms lest they forfeit their welfare aid. One can prize literacy, health and work, while still vigorously opposing the right of government to compel compliance with these values.
Conditional benefits thus result in violations of civil liberties throughout the nation, and in a pervasive oppression of the poor. And these violations are not less real because the impulse leading to them is altruistic and the agency is professional. If new systems of income distribution continue to permit the professional bureaucracies to choose when to give and when to withhold financial relief, the poor will once again be surrendered to an arrangement in which their rights are diminished in the name of overcoming their vices. Those who lead an attack on the welfare system must therefore be alert to the pitfalls of inadequate but placating reforms which give the appearance of victory to what is in truth defeat.
How much economic force can be mobilized by this strategy? This question is not easy to answer because few studies have been conducted of people who are not receiving public assistance even though they may be eligible. For the purposes of this presentation, a few facts about New York City may be suggestive. Since practices elsewhere are generally acknowledged to be even more restrictive, the estimates of unused benefits which follow probably yield a conservative estimate of the potential force of the strategy set forth in this article.
Basic assistance for food and rent: The most striking characteristic of public welfare practice is that a great many people who appear to be eligible for assistance are not on the welfare rolls. The average monthly total of New York City residents receiving assistance in 1959 was 325,771, but according to the 1960 census. 716,000 persons (unrelated or in families) appeared to be subsisting on incomes at or below the prevailing welfare eligibility levels (e.g $2,070 for a family of four). In that same year, 539,000 people subsisted on incomes less than 80 per cent of the welfare minimums, and 200,000 lived alone or in families on incomes reported to be less than half of eligibility levels. Thus it appears that for every person on welfare in 1959, at least one more was eligible.
The results of two surveys of selected areas in Manhattan support the contention that many people subsist on incomes below welfare eligibility levels. One of these, conducted by Greenleigh Associates in 1964 in an urban-renewal area on New York's upper West Side, found 9 per cent of those not on the rolls were in such acute need that they appeared to qualify for emergency assistance. The study showed, further, that a substantial number of families that were not in a "critical" condition would probably have qualified for supplemental assistance.
The other survey, conducted in 1961 by Mobilization for Youth, had similar findings. The area from which its sample was drawn, 67 square blocks on the lower East Side, is a poor one, but by no means the poorest in New York City. Yet 13 per cent of the total sample who were not on the welfare rolls reported incomes falling below the prevailing welfare schedules for food and rent.
There is no reason to suppose that the discrepancy between those eligible for and those receiving assistance has narrowed much in the past few years. The welfare rolls have gone up, to be sure, but so have eligibility levels. Since the economic circumstances of impoverished groups in New York have not improved appreciably in the past few years, each such rise increases the number of people who are potentially eligible for some degree of assistance.
Even if one allows for the possibility that family-income figures are grossly underestimated by the census, the financial implications of the proposed strategy are still very great. In 1965, the monthly average of persons receiving cash assistance in New York was 490,000, at a total cost of $440 million; the rolls have now risen above 500,000, so that costs will exceed $500 million in 1966. An increase in the rolls of a mere 20 per cent would cost an already overburdened municipality some $100 million.
Special grants: Public assistance recipients in New York are also entitled to receive "nonrecurring" grants for clothing, household equipment and furniture-including washing machines, refrigerators, beds and bedding, tables and chairs. It hardly needs to be noted that most impoverished families have grossly inadequate clothing and household furnishings. The Greenleigh study, for example, found that 52 per cent of the families on public assistance lacked anything approaching adequate furniture. This condition results because almost nothing is spent on special grants in New York. In October, 1965, a typical month, the Department of Welfare spent only $2.50 per recipient for heavy clothing and $1.30 for household furnishings. Taken together, grants of this kind amounted in 1965 to a mere $40 per person, or a total of $20 million for the entire year. Considering the real needs of families, the successful demand for full entitlements could multiply these expenditures tenfold or more and that would involve the disbursement of many millions of dollars indeed.
One must be cautious in making generalizations about the prospects for this strategy in any jurisdiction unless the structure of welfare practices has been examined in some detail. We can, however, cite other studies conducted in other places to show that New York practices are not atypical. In Detroit, for example, Greenleigh Associates studied a large sample of households in a low-income district in 1965. Twenty per cent were already receiving assistance, but 35 per cent more were judged to need it. Although the authors made no strict determination of the eligibility of these families under the laws of Michigan, they believed that "larger numbers of persons were eligible than receiving." A good many of these families did not know that public assistance was available; others thought they would be deemed ineligible; not a few were ashamed or afraid to ask.
Similar deprivations have been shown in nation-wide studies. In 1963, the federal government carried out a survey based on a national sample of 5,500 families whose benefits under Aid to Dependent Children had been terminated. Thirty-four per cent of these cases were officially in need of income at the point of closing: this was true of 30 per cent of the white and 44 per cent of the Negro cases. The chief basis for termination given in local department records was "other reasons" (i.e., other than improvement in financial condition, which would make dependence on welfare unnecessary). Upon closer examination, these "other reasons" turned out to be "unsuitable home" (i.e., the presence of illegitimate children), "failure to comply with departmental regulations'' or "refusal to take legal action against a putative father." (Negroes were especially singled out for punitive action on the ground that children were not being maintained in "suitable homes.") The amounts of money that people are deprived of by these injustices are very great.
In order to generate a crisis, the poor must obtain benefits which they have forfeited. Until now, they have been inhibited from asserting claims by self-protective devices within the welfare system: its capacity to limit information, to intimidate applicants, to demoralize recipients, and arbitrarily to deny lawful claims.
Ignorance of welfare rights can be attacked through a massive educational campaign Brochures describing benefits in simple, clear language, and urging people to seek their full entitlements, should be distributed door to door in tenements and public housing projects, and deposited in stores, schools, churches and civic centers. Advertisements should be placed in newspapers; spot announcements should be made on radio. Leaders of social, religious, fraternal and political groups in the slums should also be enlisted to recruit the eligible to the rolls. The fact that the campaign is intended to inform people of their legal rights under a government program, that it is a civic education drive, will lend it legitimacy.
But information alone will not suffice. Organizers will have to become advocates in order to deal effectively with improper rejections and terminations. The advocate's task is to appraise the circumstances of each case, to argue its merits before welfare, to threaten legal action if satisfaction is not given. In some cases, it will be necessary to contest decisions by requesting a "fair hearing" before the appropriate state supervisory agency; it may occasionally be necessary to sue for redress in the courts. Hearings and court actions will require lawyers, many of whom, in cities like New York, can be recruited on a voluntary basis, especially under the banner of a movement to end poverty by a strategy of asserting legal rights. However, most cases will not require an expert knowledge of law, but only of welfare regulations; the rules can be learned by laymen, including welfare recipients themselves (who can help to man "information and advocacy" centers). To aid workers in these centers, handbooks should be prepared describing welfare rights and the tactics to employ in claiming them.
Advocacy must be supplemented by organized demonstrations to create a climate of militancy that will overcome the invidious and immobilizing attitudes which many potential recipients hold toward being "on welfare." In such a climate, many more poor people are likely to become their own advocates and will not need to rely on aid from organizers.
As the crisis develops, it will be important to use the mass media to inform the broader liberal community about the inefficiencies and injustices of welfare. For example, the system will not be able to process many new applicants because of cumbersome and often unconstitutional investigatory procedures (which cost 20c for every dollar disbursed). As delays mount, so should the public demand that a simplified affidavit supplant these procedures, so that the poor may certify to their condition. If the system reacts by making the proof of eligibility more difficult, the demand should be made that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare dispatch "eligibility registrars" to enforce federal statutes governing local programs. And throughout the crisis, the mass media should be used to advance arguments for a new federal income distribution program.
Although new resources in organizers and funds would have to be developed to mount this campaign, a variety of conventional agencies in the large cities could also be drawn upon for help. The idea of "welfare rights" has begun to attract attention in many liberal circles. A number of organizations, partly under the aegis of the "war against poverty," are developing information and advocacy services for low-income people [see "Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State" by Richard A. Cloward and Richard M. Elman, The Nation, issues of February 28, 1966 and March 7, 1966]. It is not likely that these organizations will directly participate in the present strategy, for obvious political reasons. But whether they participate or not, they constitute a growing network of resources to which people can be referred for help in establishing and maintaining entitlements. In the final analysis, it does not matter who helps people to get on the rolls or to get additional entitlements, so long as the job is done.
Since this plan deals with problems of great immediacy In the lives of the poor, it should motivate some of them to involve themselves in regular organizational activities. Welfare recipients, chiefly ADC mothers, are already forming federations, committees and councils in cities across the nation; in Boston, New York, Newark, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit and Los Angeles, to mention a few. Such groups typically focus on obtaining full entitlements for existing recipients rather than on recruiting new recipients, and they do not yet comprise a national movement. But their very existence attests to a growing readiness among ghetto residents to act against public welfare.
To generate an expressly political movement, cadres of aggressive organizers would have to come from the civil rights movement and the churches, from militant low-income organizations like those formed by the Industrial Areas Foundation (that is, by Saul Alinsky), and from other groups on the Left. These activists should be quick to see the difference between programs to redress individual grievances and a large-scale social-action campaign for national policy reform.
Movements that depend on involving masses of poor people have generally failed in America. Why would the proposed strategy to engage the poor succeed?
First, this plan promises immediate economic benefits. This is a point of some importance because, whereas America's poor have not been moved in any number by radical political ideologies, they have sometimes been moved by their economic interests. Since radical movements in America have rarely been able to provide visible economic incentives, they have usually failed to secure mass participation of any kind. The conservative "business unionism" of organized labor is explained by this fact, for membership enlarged only as unionism paid off in material benefits. Union leaders have understood that their strength derives almost entirely from their capacity to provide economic rewards to members. Although leaders have increasingly acted in political spheres, their influence has been directed chiefly to matters of governmental policy affecting the well-being of organized workers. The same point is made by the experience of rent strikes in Northern cities. Their organizers were often motivated by radical ideologies, but tenants have been attracted by the promise that housing improvements would quickly be made if they withheld their rent.
Second, for this strategy to succeed, one need not ask more of most of the poor than that they claim lawful benefits. Thus the plan has the extraordinary capability of yielding mass influence without mass participation, at least as the term "participation" is ordinarily understood. Mass influence in this case stems from the consumption of benefits and does not require that large groups of people be involved in regular organizational roles.
Moreover, this kind of mass influence is cumulative because benefits are continuous. Once eligibility for basic food and rent grants is established, the dram on local resources persists indefinitely. Other movements have failed precisely because they could not produce continuous and cumulative influence. In the Northern rent strikes, for example, tenant participation depended largely on immediate grievances; as soon as landlords made the most minimal repairs, participation fell away and with it the impact of the movement. Efforts to revive tenant participation by organizing demonstrations around broader housing issues (e.g., the expansion of public housing) did not succeed because the incentives were not immediate.
Third, the prospects for mass influence are enhanced because this plan provides a practical basis for coalition between poor whites and poor Negroes. Advocates of low-income movements have not been able to suggest how poor whites and poor Negroes can be united in an expressly lower-class movement. Despite pleas of some Negro leaders for joint action on programs requiring integration, poor whites have steadfastly resisted making common cause with poor Negroes. By contrast, the benefits of the present plan are as great for whites as for Negroes. In the big cities, at least, it does not seem likely that poor whites, whatever their prejudices against either Negroes or public welfare, will refuse to participate when Negroes aggressively claim benefits that are unlawfully denied to them as well. One salutary consequence of public information campaigns to acquaint Negroes with their rights is that many whites will be made aware of theirs. Even if whites prefer to work through their own organizations and leaders, the consequences will be equivalent to joining with Negroes. For if the object is to focus attention on the need for new economic measures by producing a crisis over the dole, anyone who insists upon extracting maximum benefits from public welfare is in effect part of a coalition and is contributing to the cause.
The ultimate aim of this strategy is a new program for direct income distribution. What reason is there to expect that the federal government will enact such legislation in response to a crisis in the welfare system?
We ordinarily think of major legislation as taking form only through established electoral processes. We tend to overlook the force of crisis in precipitating legislative reform, partly because we lack a theoretical framework by which to understand the impact of major disruptions.
By crisis, we mean a publicly visible disruption in some institutional sphere. Crisis can occur spontaneously (e.g., riots) or as the intended result of tactics of demonstration and protest which either generate institutional disruption or bring unrecognized disruption to public attention. Public trouble is a political liability, it calls for action by political leaders to stabilize the situation. Because crisis usually creates or exposes conflict, it threatens to produce cleavages in a political consensus which politicians will ordinarily act to avert.
Although crisis impels political action, it does not itself determine the selection of specific solutions. Political leaders will try to respond with proposals which work to their advantage in the electoral process. Unless group cleavages form around issues and demands, the politician has great latitude and tends to proffer only the minimum action required to quell disturbances without risking existing electoral support. Spontaneous disruptions, such as riots, rarely produce leaders who articulate demands; thus no terms are imposed, and political leaders are permitted to respond in ways that merely restore a semblance of stability without offending other groups in a coalition.
When, however, a crisis is defined by its participants--or by other activated groups--as a matter of clear issues and preferred solutions, terms are imposed on the politicians' bid for their support. Whether political leaders then design solutions to reflect these terms depends on a twofold calculation: first, the impact of the crisis and the issues it raises on existing alignments and, second, the gains or losses in support to be expected as a result of a proposed resolution.
As to the impact on existing alignments, issues exposed by a crisis may activate new groups, thus altering the balance of support and opposition on the issues; or it may polarize group sentiments, altering the terms which must be offered to insure the support of given constituent groups. In framing resolutions, politicians are more responsive to group shifts and are more likely to accommodate to the terms imposed when electoral coalitions threatened by crisis are already uncertain or weakening. In other words, the politician responds to group demands, not only by calculating the magnitude of electoral gains and losses, but by assessing the impact of the resolution on the stability of existing or potential coalitions. Political leaders are especially responsive to group shifts when the terms of settlement can be framed so as to shore up an existing coalition, or as a basis for the development of new and more stable alignments, without jeopardizing existing support. Then, indeed, the calculation of net gain is most secure.
The legislative reforms of the depression years, for example, were impelled not so much by organized interests exercised through regular electoral processes as by widespread economic crisis. That crisis precipitated the disruption of the regionally based coalitions underlying the old national parties. During the realignments of 1932, a new Democratic coalition was formed, based heavily on urban working-class groups. Once in power, the national Democratic leadership proposed and implemented the economic reforms of the New Deal. Although these measures were a response to the imperative of economic crisis, the types of measures enacted were designed to secure and stabilize the new Democratic coalition.
The civil rights movement, to take a recent case, also reveals the relationship of crisis and electoral conditions in producing legislative reform. The crisis in the South took place in the context of a weakening North-South Democratic coalition. The strains in that coalition were first evident in the Dixiecrat desertion of 1948, and continued through the Eisenhower years as the Republicans gained ground in the Southern states. Democratic party leaders at first tried to hold the dissident South by warding off the demands of enlarging Negro constituencies in Northern cities. Thus for two decades the national Democratic Party campaigned on strongly worded civil rights planks but enacted only token measures. The civil rights movement forced the Democrats' hand: a crumbling Southern partnership was forfeited, and major civil rights legislation was put forward, designed to insure the support of Northern Negroes and liberal elements in the Democratic coalition. That coalition emerged strong from the 1964 election, easily able to overcome the loss of Southern states to Goldwater. At the same time, the enacted legislation, particularly the Voting Rights Act, laid the ground for a new Southern Democratic coalition of moderate whites and the hitherto untapped reservoir of Southern Negro voters.
The electoral context which made crisis effective in the South is also to be found in the big cities of the nation today. Deep tensions have developed among groups comprising the political coalitions of the large cities--the historic stronghold of the Democratic Party. As a consequence, urban politicians no longer turn in the vote to national Democratic candidates with unfailing regularity. The marked defections revealed in the elections of the 1950s and which continued until the Johnson landslide of 1964 are a matter of great concern to the national party. Precisely because of this concern, a strategy to exacerbate still further the strains in the urban coalition can be expected to evoke a response from national leaders.
The weakening of the urban coalition is a result of many basic changes in the relationship of local party leadership to its constituents. First, the political machine, the distinctive and traditional mechanism for forging alliances among competing groups in the city, is now virtually defunct in most cities Successive waves of municipal reform have deprived political leaders of control over the public resources--jobs, contracts, services and favors--which machine politicians formerly dispensed to voters in return for electoral support. Conflicts among elements in the urban Democratic coalition, once held together politically because each secured a share of these benefits, cannot now be so readily contained. And as the means of placating competing groups have diminished, tensions along ethnic and class lines have multiplied. These tensions are being intensified by the encroachments of an enlarging ghetto population on jobs, schools and residential areas Big-city mayors are thus caught between antagonistic working-class ethnic groups, the remaining middle class, and the rapidly enlarging minority poor.
Second, there are discontinuities in the relationship between the urban party apparatus and its ghetto constituents which have so far remained unexposed but which a welfare crisis would force into view. The ghetto vote has been growing rapidly and has so far returned overwhelming Democratic majorities. Nevertheless, this voting bloc is not fully integrated in the party apparatus, either through the representation of its leaders or the accommodation of its interests.
While the urban political apparatus includes members of new minority groups, these groups are by no means represented according to their increasing proportions in the population. More important, elected representation alone is not an adequate mechanism for the expression of group interests. Influence in urban politics is won not only at the polls but through the sustained activity of organized interests--such as labor unions, home-owner associations and business groups. These groups keep watch over the complex operations of municipal agencies, recognizing issues and regularly asserting their point of view through meetings with public officials, appearances at public hearings and the like, and by exploiting a whole array of channels of influence on government. Minority constituencies--at least the large proportion of them that are poor--are not regular participants in the various institutional spheres where organized interest groups typically develop. Thus the interests of the mass of minority poor are not protected by associations which make their own or other political leaders responsive by continuously calling them to account. Urban party organizations have become, in consequence, more an avenue for the personal advancement of minority political leaders than a channel for the expression of minority-group interests. And the big-city mayors, struggling to preserve an uneasy urban consensus, have thus been granted the slack to evade the conflict-generating interests of the ghetto. A crisis in public welfare would expose the tensions latent in this attenuated relationship between the ghetto vote and the urban party leadership, for it would thrust forward ghetto demands and back them with the threat of defections by voters who have so far remained both loyal and quiescent.
In the face of such a crisis, urban political leaders may well be paralyzed by a party apparatus which ties them to older constituent groups, even while the ranks of these groups are diminishing. The national Democratic leadership, however, is alert to the importance of the urban Negro vote, especially in national contests where the loyalty of other urban groups is weakening. Indeed, many of the legislative reforms of the Great Society can be understood as efforts, however feeble, to reinforce the allegiance of growing ghetto constituencies to the national Democratic Administration. In the thirties, Democrats began to put forward measures to circumvent the states in order to reach the big-city elements in the New Deal coalition; now it is becoming expedient to put forward measures to circumvent the weakened big-city mayors in order to reach the new minority poor.
Recent federal reforms have been impelled in part by widespread unrest in the ghetto, and instances of more aggressive Negro demands. But despite these signs that the ghetto vote may become less reliable in the future, there has been as yet no serious threat of massive defection. The national party has therefore not put much pressure on its urban branches to accommodate the minority poor. The resulting reforms have consequently been quite modest (e.g., the war against poverty, with its emphasis on the "involvement of the poor," is an effort to make the urban party apparatus somewhat more accommodating).
A welfare crisis would, of course, produce dramatic local political crisis, disrupting and exposing rifts among urban groups. Conservative Republicans are always ready to declaim the evils of public welfare, and they would probably be the first to raise a hue and cry. But deeper and politically more telling conflicts would take place within the Democratic coalition. Whites--both working-class ethnic groups and many in the middle class--would be aroused against the ghetto poor, while liberal groups, which until recently have been comforted by the notion that the poor are few and, in any event, receiving the beneficent assistance of public welfare, would probably support the movement. Group conflict, spelling political crisis for the local party apparatus, would thus become acute as welfare rolls mounted and the strains on local budgets became more severe. In New York City, where the Mayor is now facing desperate revenue shortages, welfare expenditures are already second only to those for public education.
It should also be noted that welfare costs are generally shared by local, state and federal governments, so that the crisis in the cities would intensify the struggle over revenues that is chronic in relations between cities and states. If the past is any predictor of the future, cities will fail to procure relief from this crisis by persuading states to increase their proportionate share of urban welfare costs, for state legislatures have been notoriously unsympathetic to the revenue needs of the city (especially where public welfare and minority groups are concerned).
If this strategy for crisis would intensify group cleavages, a federal income solution would not further exacerbate them. The demands put forward during recent civil rights drives in the Northern cities aroused the opposition of huge majorities. Indeed, such fierce resistance was evoked (e.g., school boycotts followed by counter-boycotts), that accessions by political leaders would have provoked greater political turmoil than the protests themselves, for profound class and ethnic interests are at stake in the employment, educational and residential institutions of our society. By contrast, legislative measures to provide direct income to the poor would permit national Democratic leaden to cultivate ghetto constituencies without unduly antagonizing other urban groups, as is the case when the battle lines are drawn over schools, housing or jobs. Furthermore, a federal income program would not only redeem local governments from the immediate crisis but would permanently relieve them of the financially and politically onerous burdens of public welfare--a function which generates support from none and hostility from many, not least of all welfare recipients. We suggest, in short, that if pervasive institutional reforms are not yet possible, requiring as they do expanded Negro political power and the development of new political alliances, crisis tactics can nevertheless be employed to secure particular reforms in the short run by exploiting weaknesses in current political alignments. Because the urban coalition stands weakened by group conflict today, disruption and threats of disaffection will count powerfully, provided that national leaders can respond with solutions which retain the support of ghetto constituencies while avoiding new group antagonisms and bolstering the urban party apparatus. These are the conditions, then, for an effective crisis strategy in the cities to secure an end to poverty.
No strategy, however confident its advocates may be, is foolproof. But if unforeseen contingencies thwart this plan to bring about new federal legislation in the field of poverty, it should also be noted that there would be gains even in defeat. For one thing, the plight of many poor people would be somewhat eased in the course of an assault upon public welfare. Existing recipients would come to know their rights and how to defend them, thus acquiring dignity where none now exists; and millions of dollars in withheld welfare benefits would become available to potential recipients now--not several generations from now. Such an attack should also be welcome to those currently concerned with programs designed to equip the young to rise out of poverty (e.g., Head Start), for surely children learn more readily when the oppressive burden of financial insecurity is lifted from the shoulders of their parents. And those seeking new ways to engage the Negro politically should remember that public resources have always been the fuel for low-income urban political organization. If organizers can deliver millions of dollars in cash benefits to the ghetto masses, it seems reasonable to expect that the masses will deliver their loyalties to their benefactors. At least, they have always done so in the past.
© 1966 The Nation
The theory here, to force change through chaos, was among the most provocative of the 1960s.
by Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven
From the Monday, May 2, 1966 issue of The Nation
How can the poor be organized to press for relief from poverty? How can a broad-based movement be developed and the current disarray of activist forces be halted? These questions confront, and confound, activists today. It is our purpose to advance a strategy which affords the basis for a convergence of civil rights organizations, militant anti-poverty groups and the poor. If this strategy were implemented, a political crisis would result that could lead to legislation for a guaranteed annual income and thus an end to poverty.
The strategy is based on the fact that a vast discrepancy exists between the benefits to which people are entitled under public welfare programs and the sums which they actually receive. This gulf is not recognized in a society that is wholly and self-righteously oriented toward getting people off the welfare rolls. It is widely known, for example, that nearly 8 million persons (half of them white) now subsist on welfare, but it is not generally known that for every person on the rolls at least one more probably meets existing criteria of eligibility but is not obtaining assistance.
The discrepancy is not an accident stemming from bureaucratic inefficiency; rather, it is an integral feature of the welfare system which, if challenged, would precipitate a profound financial and political crisis. The force for that challenge, and the strategy we propose, is a massive drive to recruit the poor onto the welfare rolls.
The distribution of public assistance has been a local and state responsibility, and that accounts in large part for the abysmal character of welfare practices. Despite the growing involvement of federal agencies in supervisory and reimbursement arrangements, state and local community forces are still decisive. The poor are most visible and proximate in the local community; antagonism toward them (and toward the agencies which are implicated with them) has always, therefore, been more intense locally than at the federal level. In recent years, local communities have increasingly felt class and ethnic friction generated by competition for neighborhoods, schools, jobs and political power. Public welfare systems are under the constant stress of conflict and opposition, made only sharper by the rising costs to localities of public aid. And, to accommodate this pressure, welfare practice everywhere has become more restrictive than welfare statute; much of the time it verges on lawlessness. Thus, public welfare systems try to keep their budgets down and their rolls low by failing to inform people of the rights available to them; by intimidating and shaming them to the degree that they are reluctant either to apply or to press claims, and by arbitrarily denying benefits to those who are eligible.
A series of welfare drives in large cities would, we believe, impel action on a new federal program to distribute income, eliminating the present public welfare system and alleviating the abject poverty which it perpetrates. Widespread campaigns to register the eligible poor for welfare aid, and to help existing recipients obtain their full benefits, would produce bureaucratic disruption in welfare agencies and fiscal disruption in local and state governments. These disruptions would generate severe political strains, and deepen existing divisions among elements in the big-city Democratic coalition: the remaining white middle class, the white working-class ethnic groups and the growing minority poor. To avoid a further weakening of that historic coalition, a national Democratic administration would be con-strained to advance a federal solution to poverty that would override local welfare failures, local class and racial conflicts and local revenue dilemmas. By the internal disruption of local bureaucratic practices, by the furor over public welfare poverty, and by the collapse of current financing arrangements, powerful forces can be generated for major economic reforms at the national level.
The ultimate objective of this strategy--to wipe out poverty by establishing a guaranteed annual income--will be questioned by some. Because the ideal of individual social and economic mobility has deep roots, even activists seem reluctant to call for national programs to eliminate poverty by the outright redistribution of income. Instead, programs are demanded to enable people to become economically competitive. But such programs are of no use to millions of today's poor. For example, one-third of the 35 million poor Americans are in families headed by females; these heads of family cannot be aided appreciably by job retraining, higher minimum wages, accelerated rates of economic growth, or employment in public works projects. Nor can the 5 million aged who are poor, nor those whose poverty results from the ill health of the wage earner. Programs to enhance individual mobility will chiefly benefit the very young, if not the as yet unborn. Individual mobility is no answer to the question of how to abolish the massive problem of poverty now.
It has never been the full answer. If many people in the past have found their way up from poverty by the path of individual mobility, many others have taken a different route. Organized labor stands out as a major example. Although many American workers never yielded their dreams of individual achievement, they accepted and practiced the principle that each can benefit only as the status of workers as a whole is elevated. They bargained for collective mobility, not for individual mobility; to promote their fortunes in the aggregate, not to promote the prospects of one worker over another. And if each finally found himself in the same relative economic relationship to his fellows as when he began, it was nevertheless clear that all were infinitely better off. That fact has sustained the labor movement in the face of a counter pull from the ideal of individual achievement.
But many of the contemporary poor will not rise from poverty by organizing to bargain collectively. They either are not in the labor force or are In such marginal and dispersed occupations (e.g., domestic servants) that it is extremely difficult to organize them. Compared with other groups, then, many of today's poor cannot secure a redistribution of income by organizing within the institution of private enterprise. A federal program of income redistribution has become necessary to elevate the poor en masse from poverty.
Several ways have been proposed for redistributing income through the federal government. It is not our purpose here to assess the relative merits of these plans, which are still undergoing debate and clarification. Whatever mechanism is eventually adopted, however, it must include certain features if it is not merely to perpetuate in a new guise the present evils of the public welfare system.
First, adequate levels of income must be assured. (Public welfare levels are astonishingly low; indeed, states typically define a "minimum" standard of living and then grant only a percentage of it, so that families are held well below what the government itself officially defines as the poverty level.) Furthermore, income should be distributed without requiring that recipients first divest themselves of their assets, as public welfare now does, thereby pauperizing families as a condition of sustenance.
Second, the right to income must be guaranteed, or the oppression of the welfare poor will not be eliminated. Because benefits are conditional under the present public welfare system, submission to arbitrary governmental power is regularly made the price of sustenance. People have been coerced into attending literacy classes or participating in medical or vocational rehabilitation regimes, on pain of having their benefits terminated. Men are forced into labor on virtually any terms lest they forfeit their welfare aid. One can prize literacy, health and work, while still vigorously opposing the right of government to compel compliance with these values.
Conditional benefits thus result in violations of civil liberties throughout the nation, and in a pervasive oppression of the poor. And these violations are not less real because the impulse leading to them is altruistic and the agency is professional. If new systems of income distribution continue to permit the professional bureaucracies to choose when to give and when to withhold financial relief, the poor will once again be surrendered to an arrangement in which their rights are diminished in the name of overcoming their vices. Those who lead an attack on the welfare system must therefore be alert to the pitfalls of inadequate but placating reforms which give the appearance of victory to what is in truth defeat.
How much economic force can be mobilized by this strategy? This question is not easy to answer because few studies have been conducted of people who are not receiving public assistance even though they may be eligible. For the purposes of this presentation, a few facts about New York City may be suggestive. Since practices elsewhere are generally acknowledged to be even more restrictive, the estimates of unused benefits which follow probably yield a conservative estimate of the potential force of the strategy set forth in this article.
Basic assistance for food and rent: The most striking characteristic of public welfare practice is that a great many people who appear to be eligible for assistance are not on the welfare rolls. The average monthly total of New York City residents receiving assistance in 1959 was 325,771, but according to the 1960 census. 716,000 persons (unrelated or in families) appeared to be subsisting on incomes at or below the prevailing welfare eligibility levels (e.g $2,070 for a family of four). In that same year, 539,000 people subsisted on incomes less than 80 per cent of the welfare minimums, and 200,000 lived alone or in families on incomes reported to be less than half of eligibility levels. Thus it appears that for every person on welfare in 1959, at least one more was eligible.
The results of two surveys of selected areas in Manhattan support the contention that many people subsist on incomes below welfare eligibility levels. One of these, conducted by Greenleigh Associates in 1964 in an urban-renewal area on New York's upper West Side, found 9 per cent of those not on the rolls were in such acute need that they appeared to qualify for emergency assistance. The study showed, further, that a substantial number of families that were not in a "critical" condition would probably have qualified for supplemental assistance.
The other survey, conducted in 1961 by Mobilization for Youth, had similar findings. The area from which its sample was drawn, 67 square blocks on the lower East Side, is a poor one, but by no means the poorest in New York City. Yet 13 per cent of the total sample who were not on the welfare rolls reported incomes falling below the prevailing welfare schedules for food and rent.
There is no reason to suppose that the discrepancy between those eligible for and those receiving assistance has narrowed much in the past few years. The welfare rolls have gone up, to be sure, but so have eligibility levels. Since the economic circumstances of impoverished groups in New York have not improved appreciably in the past few years, each such rise increases the number of people who are potentially eligible for some degree of assistance.
Even if one allows for the possibility that family-income figures are grossly underestimated by the census, the financial implications of the proposed strategy are still very great. In 1965, the monthly average of persons receiving cash assistance in New York was 490,000, at a total cost of $440 million; the rolls have now risen above 500,000, so that costs will exceed $500 million in 1966. An increase in the rolls of a mere 20 per cent would cost an already overburdened municipality some $100 million.
Special grants: Public assistance recipients in New York are also entitled to receive "nonrecurring" grants for clothing, household equipment and furniture-including washing machines, refrigerators, beds and bedding, tables and chairs. It hardly needs to be noted that most impoverished families have grossly inadequate clothing and household furnishings. The Greenleigh study, for example, found that 52 per cent of the families on public assistance lacked anything approaching adequate furniture. This condition results because almost nothing is spent on special grants in New York. In October, 1965, a typical month, the Department of Welfare spent only $2.50 per recipient for heavy clothing and $1.30 for household furnishings. Taken together, grants of this kind amounted in 1965 to a mere $40 per person, or a total of $20 million for the entire year. Considering the real needs of families, the successful demand for full entitlements could multiply these expenditures tenfold or more and that would involve the disbursement of many millions of dollars indeed.
One must be cautious in making generalizations about the prospects for this strategy in any jurisdiction unless the structure of welfare practices has been examined in some detail. We can, however, cite other studies conducted in other places to show that New York practices are not atypical. In Detroit, for example, Greenleigh Associates studied a large sample of households in a low-income district in 1965. Twenty per cent were already receiving assistance, but 35 per cent more were judged to need it. Although the authors made no strict determination of the eligibility of these families under the laws of Michigan, they believed that "larger numbers of persons were eligible than receiving." A good many of these families did not know that public assistance was available; others thought they would be deemed ineligible; not a few were ashamed or afraid to ask.
Similar deprivations have been shown in nation-wide studies. In 1963, the federal government carried out a survey based on a national sample of 5,500 families whose benefits under Aid to Dependent Children had been terminated. Thirty-four per cent of these cases were officially in need of income at the point of closing: this was true of 30 per cent of the white and 44 per cent of the Negro cases. The chief basis for termination given in local department records was "other reasons" (i.e., other than improvement in financial condition, which would make dependence on welfare unnecessary). Upon closer examination, these "other reasons" turned out to be "unsuitable home" (i.e., the presence of illegitimate children), "failure to comply with departmental regulations'' or "refusal to take legal action against a putative father." (Negroes were especially singled out for punitive action on the ground that children were not being maintained in "suitable homes.") The amounts of money that people are deprived of by these injustices are very great.
In order to generate a crisis, the poor must obtain benefits which they have forfeited. Until now, they have been inhibited from asserting claims by self-protective devices within the welfare system: its capacity to limit information, to intimidate applicants, to demoralize recipients, and arbitrarily to deny lawful claims.
Ignorance of welfare rights can be attacked through a massive educational campaign Brochures describing benefits in simple, clear language, and urging people to seek their full entitlements, should be distributed door to door in tenements and public housing projects, and deposited in stores, schools, churches and civic centers. Advertisements should be placed in newspapers; spot announcements should be made on radio. Leaders of social, religious, fraternal and political groups in the slums should also be enlisted to recruit the eligible to the rolls. The fact that the campaign is intended to inform people of their legal rights under a government program, that it is a civic education drive, will lend it legitimacy.
But information alone will not suffice. Organizers will have to become advocates in order to deal effectively with improper rejections and terminations. The advocate's task is to appraise the circumstances of each case, to argue its merits before welfare, to threaten legal action if satisfaction is not given. In some cases, it will be necessary to contest decisions by requesting a "fair hearing" before the appropriate state supervisory agency; it may occasionally be necessary to sue for redress in the courts. Hearings and court actions will require lawyers, many of whom, in cities like New York, can be recruited on a voluntary basis, especially under the banner of a movement to end poverty by a strategy of asserting legal rights. However, most cases will not require an expert knowledge of law, but only of welfare regulations; the rules can be learned by laymen, including welfare recipients themselves (who can help to man "information and advocacy" centers). To aid workers in these centers, handbooks should be prepared describing welfare rights and the tactics to employ in claiming them.
Advocacy must be supplemented by organized demonstrations to create a climate of militancy that will overcome the invidious and immobilizing attitudes which many potential recipients hold toward being "on welfare." In such a climate, many more poor people are likely to become their own advocates and will not need to rely on aid from organizers.
As the crisis develops, it will be important to use the mass media to inform the broader liberal community about the inefficiencies and injustices of welfare. For example, the system will not be able to process many new applicants because of cumbersome and often unconstitutional investigatory procedures (which cost 20c for every dollar disbursed). As delays mount, so should the public demand that a simplified affidavit supplant these procedures, so that the poor may certify to their condition. If the system reacts by making the proof of eligibility more difficult, the demand should be made that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare dispatch "eligibility registrars" to enforce federal statutes governing local programs. And throughout the crisis, the mass media should be used to advance arguments for a new federal income distribution program.
Although new resources in organizers and funds would have to be developed to mount this campaign, a variety of conventional agencies in the large cities could also be drawn upon for help. The idea of "welfare rights" has begun to attract attention in many liberal circles. A number of organizations, partly under the aegis of the "war against poverty," are developing information and advocacy services for low-income people [see "Poverty, Injustice and the Welfare State" by Richard A. Cloward and Richard M. Elman, The Nation, issues of February 28, 1966 and March 7, 1966]. It is not likely that these organizations will directly participate in the present strategy, for obvious political reasons. But whether they participate or not, they constitute a growing network of resources to which people can be referred for help in establishing and maintaining entitlements. In the final analysis, it does not matter who helps people to get on the rolls or to get additional entitlements, so long as the job is done.
Since this plan deals with problems of great immediacy In the lives of the poor, it should motivate some of them to involve themselves in regular organizational activities. Welfare recipients, chiefly ADC mothers, are already forming federations, committees and councils in cities across the nation; in Boston, New York, Newark, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit and Los Angeles, to mention a few. Such groups typically focus on obtaining full entitlements for existing recipients rather than on recruiting new recipients, and they do not yet comprise a national movement. But their very existence attests to a growing readiness among ghetto residents to act against public welfare.
To generate an expressly political movement, cadres of aggressive organizers would have to come from the civil rights movement and the churches, from militant low-income organizations like those formed by the Industrial Areas Foundation (that is, by Saul Alinsky), and from other groups on the Left. These activists should be quick to see the difference between programs to redress individual grievances and a large-scale social-action campaign for national policy reform.
Movements that depend on involving masses of poor people have generally failed in America. Why would the proposed strategy to engage the poor succeed?
First, this plan promises immediate economic benefits. This is a point of some importance because, whereas America's poor have not been moved in any number by radical political ideologies, they have sometimes been moved by their economic interests. Since radical movements in America have rarely been able to provide visible economic incentives, they have usually failed to secure mass participation of any kind. The conservative "business unionism" of organized labor is explained by this fact, for membership enlarged only as unionism paid off in material benefits. Union leaders have understood that their strength derives almost entirely from their capacity to provide economic rewards to members. Although leaders have increasingly acted in political spheres, their influence has been directed chiefly to matters of governmental policy affecting the well-being of organized workers. The same point is made by the experience of rent strikes in Northern cities. Their organizers were often motivated by radical ideologies, but tenants have been attracted by the promise that housing improvements would quickly be made if they withheld their rent.
Second, for this strategy to succeed, one need not ask more of most of the poor than that they claim lawful benefits. Thus the plan has the extraordinary capability of yielding mass influence without mass participation, at least as the term "participation" is ordinarily understood. Mass influence in this case stems from the consumption of benefits and does not require that large groups of people be involved in regular organizational roles.
Moreover, this kind of mass influence is cumulative because benefits are continuous. Once eligibility for basic food and rent grants is established, the dram on local resources persists indefinitely. Other movements have failed precisely because they could not produce continuous and cumulative influence. In the Northern rent strikes, for example, tenant participation depended largely on immediate grievances; as soon as landlords made the most minimal repairs, participation fell away and with it the impact of the movement. Efforts to revive tenant participation by organizing demonstrations around broader housing issues (e.g., the expansion of public housing) did not succeed because the incentives were not immediate.
Third, the prospects for mass influence are enhanced because this plan provides a practical basis for coalition between poor whites and poor Negroes. Advocates of low-income movements have not been able to suggest how poor whites and poor Negroes can be united in an expressly lower-class movement. Despite pleas of some Negro leaders for joint action on programs requiring integration, poor whites have steadfastly resisted making common cause with poor Negroes. By contrast, the benefits of the present plan are as great for whites as for Negroes. In the big cities, at least, it does not seem likely that poor whites, whatever their prejudices against either Negroes or public welfare, will refuse to participate when Negroes aggressively claim benefits that are unlawfully denied to them as well. One salutary consequence of public information campaigns to acquaint Negroes with their rights is that many whites will be made aware of theirs. Even if whites prefer to work through their own organizations and leaders, the consequences will be equivalent to joining with Negroes. For if the object is to focus attention on the need for new economic measures by producing a crisis over the dole, anyone who insists upon extracting maximum benefits from public welfare is in effect part of a coalition and is contributing to the cause.
The ultimate aim of this strategy is a new program for direct income distribution. What reason is there to expect that the federal government will enact such legislation in response to a crisis in the welfare system?
We ordinarily think of major legislation as taking form only through established electoral processes. We tend to overlook the force of crisis in precipitating legislative reform, partly because we lack a theoretical framework by which to understand the impact of major disruptions.
By crisis, we mean a publicly visible disruption in some institutional sphere. Crisis can occur spontaneously (e.g., riots) or as the intended result of tactics of demonstration and protest which either generate institutional disruption or bring unrecognized disruption to public attention. Public trouble is a political liability, it calls for action by political leaders to stabilize the situation. Because crisis usually creates or exposes conflict, it threatens to produce cleavages in a political consensus which politicians will ordinarily act to avert.
Although crisis impels political action, it does not itself determine the selection of specific solutions. Political leaders will try to respond with proposals which work to their advantage in the electoral process. Unless group cleavages form around issues and demands, the politician has great latitude and tends to proffer only the minimum action required to quell disturbances without risking existing electoral support. Spontaneous disruptions, such as riots, rarely produce leaders who articulate demands; thus no terms are imposed, and political leaders are permitted to respond in ways that merely restore a semblance of stability without offending other groups in a coalition.
When, however, a crisis is defined by its participants--or by other activated groups--as a matter of clear issues and preferred solutions, terms are imposed on the politicians' bid for their support. Whether political leaders then design solutions to reflect these terms depends on a twofold calculation: first, the impact of the crisis and the issues it raises on existing alignments and, second, the gains or losses in support to be expected as a result of a proposed resolution.
As to the impact on existing alignments, issues exposed by a crisis may activate new groups, thus altering the balance of support and opposition on the issues; or it may polarize group sentiments, altering the terms which must be offered to insure the support of given constituent groups. In framing resolutions, politicians are more responsive to group shifts and are more likely to accommodate to the terms imposed when electoral coalitions threatened by crisis are already uncertain or weakening. In other words, the politician responds to group demands, not only by calculating the magnitude of electoral gains and losses, but by assessing the impact of the resolution on the stability of existing or potential coalitions. Political leaders are especially responsive to group shifts when the terms of settlement can be framed so as to shore up an existing coalition, or as a basis for the development of new and more stable alignments, without jeopardizing existing support. Then, indeed, the calculation of net gain is most secure.
The legislative reforms of the depression years, for example, were impelled not so much by organized interests exercised through regular electoral processes as by widespread economic crisis. That crisis precipitated the disruption of the regionally based coalitions underlying the old national parties. During the realignments of 1932, a new Democratic coalition was formed, based heavily on urban working-class groups. Once in power, the national Democratic leadership proposed and implemented the economic reforms of the New Deal. Although these measures were a response to the imperative of economic crisis, the types of measures enacted were designed to secure and stabilize the new Democratic coalition.
The civil rights movement, to take a recent case, also reveals the relationship of crisis and electoral conditions in producing legislative reform. The crisis in the South took place in the context of a weakening North-South Democratic coalition. The strains in that coalition were first evident in the Dixiecrat desertion of 1948, and continued through the Eisenhower years as the Republicans gained ground in the Southern states. Democratic party leaders at first tried to hold the dissident South by warding off the demands of enlarging Negro constituencies in Northern cities. Thus for two decades the national Democratic Party campaigned on strongly worded civil rights planks but enacted only token measures. The civil rights movement forced the Democrats' hand: a crumbling Southern partnership was forfeited, and major civil rights legislation was put forward, designed to insure the support of Northern Negroes and liberal elements in the Democratic coalition. That coalition emerged strong from the 1964 election, easily able to overcome the loss of Southern states to Goldwater. At the same time, the enacted legislation, particularly the Voting Rights Act, laid the ground for a new Southern Democratic coalition of moderate whites and the hitherto untapped reservoir of Southern Negro voters.
The electoral context which made crisis effective in the South is also to be found in the big cities of the nation today. Deep tensions have developed among groups comprising the political coalitions of the large cities--the historic stronghold of the Democratic Party. As a consequence, urban politicians no longer turn in the vote to national Democratic candidates with unfailing regularity. The marked defections revealed in the elections of the 1950s and which continued until the Johnson landslide of 1964 are a matter of great concern to the national party. Precisely because of this concern, a strategy to exacerbate still further the strains in the urban coalition can be expected to evoke a response from national leaders.
The weakening of the urban coalition is a result of many basic changes in the relationship of local party leadership to its constituents. First, the political machine, the distinctive and traditional mechanism for forging alliances among competing groups in the city, is now virtually defunct in most cities Successive waves of municipal reform have deprived political leaders of control over the public resources--jobs, contracts, services and favors--which machine politicians formerly dispensed to voters in return for electoral support. Conflicts among elements in the urban Democratic coalition, once held together politically because each secured a share of these benefits, cannot now be so readily contained. And as the means of placating competing groups have diminished, tensions along ethnic and class lines have multiplied. These tensions are being intensified by the encroachments of an enlarging ghetto population on jobs, schools and residential areas Big-city mayors are thus caught between antagonistic working-class ethnic groups, the remaining middle class, and the rapidly enlarging minority poor.
Second, there are discontinuities in the relationship between the urban party apparatus and its ghetto constituents which have so far remained unexposed but which a welfare crisis would force into view. The ghetto vote has been growing rapidly and has so far returned overwhelming Democratic majorities. Nevertheless, this voting bloc is not fully integrated in the party apparatus, either through the representation of its leaders or the accommodation of its interests.
While the urban political apparatus includes members of new minority groups, these groups are by no means represented according to their increasing proportions in the population. More important, elected representation alone is not an adequate mechanism for the expression of group interests. Influence in urban politics is won not only at the polls but through the sustained activity of organized interests--such as labor unions, home-owner associations and business groups. These groups keep watch over the complex operations of municipal agencies, recognizing issues and regularly asserting their point of view through meetings with public officials, appearances at public hearings and the like, and by exploiting a whole array of channels of influence on government. Minority constituencies--at least the large proportion of them that are poor--are not regular participants in the various institutional spheres where organized interest groups typically develop. Thus the interests of the mass of minority poor are not protected by associations which make their own or other political leaders responsive by continuously calling them to account. Urban party organizations have become, in consequence, more an avenue for the personal advancement of minority political leaders than a channel for the expression of minority-group interests. And the big-city mayors, struggling to preserve an uneasy urban consensus, have thus been granted the slack to evade the conflict-generating interests of the ghetto. A crisis in public welfare would expose the tensions latent in this attenuated relationship between the ghetto vote and the urban party leadership, for it would thrust forward ghetto demands and back them with the threat of defections by voters who have so far remained both loyal and quiescent.
In the face of such a crisis, urban political leaders may well be paralyzed by a party apparatus which ties them to older constituent groups, even while the ranks of these groups are diminishing. The national Democratic leadership, however, is alert to the importance of the urban Negro vote, especially in national contests where the loyalty of other urban groups is weakening. Indeed, many of the legislative reforms of the Great Society can be understood as efforts, however feeble, to reinforce the allegiance of growing ghetto constituencies to the national Democratic Administration. In the thirties, Democrats began to put forward measures to circumvent the states in order to reach the big-city elements in the New Deal coalition; now it is becoming expedient to put forward measures to circumvent the weakened big-city mayors in order to reach the new minority poor.
Recent federal reforms have been impelled in part by widespread unrest in the ghetto, and instances of more aggressive Negro demands. But despite these signs that the ghetto vote may become less reliable in the future, there has been as yet no serious threat of massive defection. The national party has therefore not put much pressure on its urban branches to accommodate the minority poor. The resulting reforms have consequently been quite modest (e.g., the war against poverty, with its emphasis on the "involvement of the poor," is an effort to make the urban party apparatus somewhat more accommodating).
A welfare crisis would, of course, produce dramatic local political crisis, disrupting and exposing rifts among urban groups. Conservative Republicans are always ready to declaim the evils of public welfare, and they would probably be the first to raise a hue and cry. But deeper and politically more telling conflicts would take place within the Democratic coalition. Whites--both working-class ethnic groups and many in the middle class--would be aroused against the ghetto poor, while liberal groups, which until recently have been comforted by the notion that the poor are few and, in any event, receiving the beneficent assistance of public welfare, would probably support the movement. Group conflict, spelling political crisis for the local party apparatus, would thus become acute as welfare rolls mounted and the strains on local budgets became more severe. In New York City, where the Mayor is now facing desperate revenue shortages, welfare expenditures are already second only to those for public education.
It should also be noted that welfare costs are generally shared by local, state and federal governments, so that the crisis in the cities would intensify the struggle over revenues that is chronic in relations between cities and states. If the past is any predictor of the future, cities will fail to procure relief from this crisis by persuading states to increase their proportionate share of urban welfare costs, for state legislatures have been notoriously unsympathetic to the revenue needs of the city (especially where public welfare and minority groups are concerned).
If this strategy for crisis would intensify group cleavages, a federal income solution would not further exacerbate them. The demands put forward during recent civil rights drives in the Northern cities aroused the opposition of huge majorities. Indeed, such fierce resistance was evoked (e.g., school boycotts followed by counter-boycotts), that accessions by political leaders would have provoked greater political turmoil than the protests themselves, for profound class and ethnic interests are at stake in the employment, educational and residential institutions of our society. By contrast, legislative measures to provide direct income to the poor would permit national Democratic leaden to cultivate ghetto constituencies without unduly antagonizing other urban groups, as is the case when the battle lines are drawn over schools, housing or jobs. Furthermore, a federal income program would not only redeem local governments from the immediate crisis but would permanently relieve them of the financially and politically onerous burdens of public welfare--a function which generates support from none and hostility from many, not least of all welfare recipients. We suggest, in short, that if pervasive institutional reforms are not yet possible, requiring as they do expanded Negro political power and the development of new political alliances, crisis tactics can nevertheless be employed to secure particular reforms in the short run by exploiting weaknesses in current political alignments. Because the urban coalition stands weakened by group conflict today, disruption and threats of disaffection will count powerfully, provided that national leaders can respond with solutions which retain the support of ghetto constituencies while avoiding new group antagonisms and bolstering the urban party apparatus. These are the conditions, then, for an effective crisis strategy in the cities to secure an end to poverty.
No strategy, however confident its advocates may be, is foolproof. But if unforeseen contingencies thwart this plan to bring about new federal legislation in the field of poverty, it should also be noted that there would be gains even in defeat. For one thing, the plight of many poor people would be somewhat eased in the course of an assault upon public welfare. Existing recipients would come to know their rights and how to defend them, thus acquiring dignity where none now exists; and millions of dollars in withheld welfare benefits would become available to potential recipients now--not several generations from now. Such an attack should also be welcome to those currently concerned with programs designed to equip the young to rise out of poverty (e.g., Head Start), for surely children learn more readily when the oppressive burden of financial insecurity is lifted from the shoulders of their parents. And those seeking new ways to engage the Negro politically should remember that public resources have always been the fuel for low-income urban political organization. If organizers can deliver millions of dollars in cash benefits to the ghetto masses, it seems reasonable to expect that the masses will deliver their loyalties to their benefactors. At least, they have always done so in the past.
© 1966 The Nation
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Friday, February 26, 2010
Another Government Post
Tracking the events of the health-care summit yesterday brought many thoughts to my mind, but most of all I wondered just how anyone who watched or listened could ever believe that those dilectical schemers had any intention of reforming anything.
Universal health care is a fantasy; universal health care regulated, managed or provided by a government is a stop-action nightmare.
Insurance is immoral. Expecting someone else to subsidize your insurance is to actively participate in theft.
Please, please, please, please understand this, if nothing else, none of the existing propositions, on either side, will enhance the quality of medical care in this country and, in fact, will decrease the availabilty, quality and affordability. If passed, a black market will develop which will widen the gap between the haves and have-nots.
In order to understand why this legislation is so important to the powers in DC, you must first understand who they work for - and I don't mean the CFR, the Illuminati, Committee of 300, or any other suspect organization - I mean the power which sits above even them and controls them and to whom they pledge fealty.
Yes, you guessed it: Satan and his co-conspirators.
Just in case I am not being clear, the US federal government is not a godly goverment..nor should they be expected to be.
This government, all governments in this present age, are not part of the Kingdom of Heaven.
So let's all get busy and change it, right!
Change it to what, may I ask?
In order to change the system, you must join the system, and to join the system you must pay the price. Can you afford that price?
On top of the cost, if you are truly one of the elect, they will take your payment and then destroy you anyway.
What those of us who desire to be in the Kingdom of Heaven have to realize that we cannot participate in the kingdom of hell and succeed. Why would you want to? The world system is nothing but an illusion. Success inside the system is a deception.
But there is a deeper issue, far deeper.
Who you look to for your provision is your god. If the state provides you medical care, i.e., is perceived to preserve life, then it is your god.
We are not to look to anyone but God for life.
It is a time for choice.
Universal health care is a fantasy; universal health care regulated, managed or provided by a government is a stop-action nightmare.
Insurance is immoral. Expecting someone else to subsidize your insurance is to actively participate in theft.
Please, please, please, please understand this, if nothing else, none of the existing propositions, on either side, will enhance the quality of medical care in this country and, in fact, will decrease the availabilty, quality and affordability. If passed, a black market will develop which will widen the gap between the haves and have-nots.
In order to understand why this legislation is so important to the powers in DC, you must first understand who they work for - and I don't mean the CFR, the Illuminati, Committee of 300, or any other suspect organization - I mean the power which sits above even them and controls them and to whom they pledge fealty.
Yes, you guessed it: Satan and his co-conspirators.
Just in case I am not being clear, the US federal government is not a godly goverment..nor should they be expected to be.
This government, all governments in this present age, are not part of the Kingdom of Heaven.
So let's all get busy and change it, right!
Change it to what, may I ask?
In order to change the system, you must join the system, and to join the system you must pay the price. Can you afford that price?
On top of the cost, if you are truly one of the elect, they will take your payment and then destroy you anyway.
What those of us who desire to be in the Kingdom of Heaven have to realize that we cannot participate in the kingdom of hell and succeed. Why would you want to? The world system is nothing but an illusion. Success inside the system is a deception.
But there is a deeper issue, far deeper.
Who you look to for your provision is your god. If the state provides you medical care, i.e., is perceived to preserve life, then it is your god.
We are not to look to anyone but God for life.
It is a time for choice.
Friday, December 25, 2009
2010
There is little doubt that 2009 was a year filled with dreadful events - but so was 2008 and 2007 and 2001 and 1941 and well, you get the point. Death, mendacity and tyranny were the modus operandi of everyone from the politicians to the corporations to the religious establishment. What was most shocking this year to me was how naked and open evil has become; there was no attempt by the enemy to disguise his intents or for his henchmen to finesse their plots through to fruition. Evil was bold and unfettered as if it expected no opposition of any consequence.
As the secular calendar turns the page to a new year, it seems as if there may be some who are persuaded that there is reason to believe that the road to serfdom we are marching down can be blocked and that we can be returned back to the rightful path.
I wish I could agree.
Frankly, I don't see the efforts of the so-called patriot movement and the mainstream political opposition have accomplished any more than providing a false sense of empowerment to the people involved. They are doing the same things they have been doing since I came out of the TV stupor and began to understand where the real battle was and to recognize the false paradigms imposed on the world. The alarms are sounded, everyone scurries around, guns are sold, food is hoarded, gold and silver become scarce commodities, fear gives way to panic and then...nothing happens and it starts all over again the next week.
So, what is going to happen during the next 12 months?
The Health-care usurpation is still on track. Carbon regulation is about to take place by fiat rather than legislation. The state will soon actually, legally, take control over life and death and place it in the hands of bureaucrats whose only interest is to maintain their job, not solve problems.
Will the democrats be run out of office and replaced with republicans? Will the President declare martial law? Are we all getting bar codes?
Frankly, I don't see much changing.
Health-care will more than likely become law - and it will be a disaster. Yet I see the democrats retaining power because the real effects won't be felt until well after the election.
Don't be surprised if there are several million newly registered voters to make certain that happens as, by law or fiat, many currently illegal migrants are made citizens.
Journalism will still suck, but some of those who believed in the hope and change are becoming disillusioned and there will be some prominent defections this year.
Global warming and/or climate change will fall from favor and carbon taxes will start to take a back seat to other issues: inflation, fuel shortages, more terror (by someone) short credit, higher unemployment, a second wave of real estate failures, regional strife and the political battles moving to the local level and not in a peaceful way.
There's no better time for the believer to disengage from the system as much as possible.
What do you see for the coming months?
As the secular calendar turns the page to a new year, it seems as if there may be some who are persuaded that there is reason to believe that the road to serfdom we are marching down can be blocked and that we can be returned back to the rightful path.
I wish I could agree.
Frankly, I don't see the efforts of the so-called patriot movement and the mainstream political opposition have accomplished any more than providing a false sense of empowerment to the people involved. They are doing the same things they have been doing since I came out of the TV stupor and began to understand where the real battle was and to recognize the false paradigms imposed on the world. The alarms are sounded, everyone scurries around, guns are sold, food is hoarded, gold and silver become scarce commodities, fear gives way to panic and then...nothing happens and it starts all over again the next week.
So, what is going to happen during the next 12 months?
The Health-care usurpation is still on track. Carbon regulation is about to take place by fiat rather than legislation. The state will soon actually, legally, take control over life and death and place it in the hands of bureaucrats whose only interest is to maintain their job, not solve problems.
Will the democrats be run out of office and replaced with republicans? Will the President declare martial law? Are we all getting bar codes?
Frankly, I don't see much changing.
Health-care will more than likely become law - and it will be a disaster. Yet I see the democrats retaining power because the real effects won't be felt until well after the election.
Don't be surprised if there are several million newly registered voters to make certain that happens as, by law or fiat, many currently illegal migrants are made citizens.
Journalism will still suck, but some of those who believed in the hope and change are becoming disillusioned and there will be some prominent defections this year.
Global warming and/or climate change will fall from favor and carbon taxes will start to take a back seat to other issues: inflation, fuel shortages, more terror (by someone) short credit, higher unemployment, a second wave of real estate failures, regional strife and the political battles moving to the local level and not in a peaceful way.
There's no better time for the believer to disengage from the system as much as possible.
What do you see for the coming months?
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Friday, October 30, 2009
History Lesson
When Amenhotep II returned from his triumphant suppression of a Syrio-Palestinian uprising (at least he claimed a victory), he did not return to a land euphoric with his display of Egyptian power - instead, he found his father, Thutmose III, dead, his older brother, Thutmose IV dead, his oldest son dead, and the nation in mourning at the mass death which had just occurred, a devastated economy, and a major portion of the national workforce gone.
What should have been a ticker-tape parade through downtown Luxor turned into a rampage through Egypt that would have made Sherman' s march through the South seem compassionate.
A crazed general and his battle-fatigued troops found that all that they had fought to defend and uphold with blood and treasure had completely disappeared while they were out of town and they reacted with madness and violence. Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of innocents died, cities were razed, a trail of smoke and rubble marked Amenhotep trek home.
Do we really know why Amenhotep attacked his own land? Not really. But can we imagine that in his search for answers and reasons, finding only platitudes and non-answers, that he struck out blindly at those he deemed responsible and the quest rolled over targets and blameless alike; can we not envision the psychic shock he and the army must have experienced?
We do know that Egypt never truly recovered and the civilization began an unchecked decline.
For over eight years in Afghanistan, and six years in Iraq, our soldiers and our Generals have waged war in an asymmetrical environment, against an uncertain enemy, to achieve polemical and contradictory goals.
When our exhausted fighters return home, they do not find themselves heralded as conquering heroes, or defenders of freedom, or even recognized publicly as the special and courageous people they are, but are avoided and labelled as threats to domestic tranquility, denied the most basic of care and restoration...thrown away to die from the poisons they were administered and the psychological trauma they experienced.
At home they find their families poorer, their neighbors spys, the freedoms they believed they were defending diminished, and their prospects limited.
Some even suggest they find more comfort on the battlefield than in the home.
Our putative leaders need a history lesson - from Egypt.
Is there an Amenhotep in the American army? If there is, the regime needs to be aware (as if they were not already) the threat is not against the American people.
What should have been a ticker-tape parade through downtown Luxor turned into a rampage through Egypt that would have made Sherman' s march through the South seem compassionate.
A crazed general and his battle-fatigued troops found that all that they had fought to defend and uphold with blood and treasure had completely disappeared while they were out of town and they reacted with madness and violence. Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of innocents died, cities were razed, a trail of smoke and rubble marked Amenhotep trek home.
Do we really know why Amenhotep attacked his own land? Not really. But can we imagine that in his search for answers and reasons, finding only platitudes and non-answers, that he struck out blindly at those he deemed responsible and the quest rolled over targets and blameless alike; can we not envision the psychic shock he and the army must have experienced?
We do know that Egypt never truly recovered and the civilization began an unchecked decline.
For over eight years in Afghanistan, and six years in Iraq, our soldiers and our Generals have waged war in an asymmetrical environment, against an uncertain enemy, to achieve polemical and contradictory goals.
When our exhausted fighters return home, they do not find themselves heralded as conquering heroes, or defenders of freedom, or even recognized publicly as the special and courageous people they are, but are avoided and labelled as threats to domestic tranquility, denied the most basic of care and restoration...thrown away to die from the poisons they were administered and the psychological trauma they experienced.
At home they find their families poorer, their neighbors spys, the freedoms they believed they were defending diminished, and their prospects limited.
Some even suggest they find more comfort on the battlefield than in the home.
Our putative leaders need a history lesson - from Egypt.
Is there an Amenhotep in the American army? If there is, the regime needs to be aware (as if they were not already) the threat is not against the American people.
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Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Take No Thought for the Morrow...a Question on the Parameters of Faith
Okay, I am venturing out into new and unexplored territory...for me.
Some are probably already here, by choice or by circumstances, patiently waiting for me to arrive. Well, here I am.
The subject is health insurance. Paying for healthcare is the uppermost topic of conversation all over the nation and has been for the past few months. If you are reading this, it is likely you are familiar with all sides of that debate, and just as likely you are tired of the fight and worried about the outcome.
And that leads to the issue I wish to consider in this article: Is it appropriate for a believer and follower of The Way to purchase health insurance in any form?
Up until a few days ago, there was no doubt in my mind that it was irresponsible and imprudent not to carry health insurance if at all possible financially - especially if I had others to provide for (spouse, children)who depended on my provision and care. Frankly, I don't believe I would have given a suggestion to the contrary a moment's consideration.
Yet, here I am, seriously questioning it.
What happened?
For a number of years I have been researching what is generally called alternative medicine - primarily herbalism and traditional medicine but also including modern concepts which are outside of the mainstream of medical practice yet relatively recent and similarly presented (vitamin therapy, chelation, sound therapy, and the like). An inevitable corrollary of this research is uncovering a great deal of information about the process and problems of contemporary allopathic medicine.
Most insurance will not cover herbal, traditional or any other natural or alternate approach to health and healing. Likewise, most mainstream physicians are ignorant about traditional or alternative therapies - a large percentage reject them outright and it is not uncommon for one to reject or terminate a relationship with a patient who chooses alternative medicine as a supplement to or instead of generally accepted practices.
The same goes for insurance. Patients who refuse to adhere to allopathic methodology can find themselves cancelled, and, in effect, blackballed, uninsurable for choices ranging from refusing vaccines to forgoing chemotherapy.
Insurers dictate to patients which courses of treatment are acceptable and covered by the policy. Deviation from the approved parameters are refused payment.
Fear of accumulating large medical debt forces patients to conform to the system and take what is offered - even if they don't believe in the effectiveness of the treatment.
My questions are derived from this understanding of how the system works:
1. We are told that we are not to be conformed to the world, but to Yashua. If we have health insurance which prevents us from using treatments we think are more effective or requires us to accept measures we know are ineffective or even harmful, aren't we conforming to the world?
2. Believers are not supposed to be in debt because the debtor becomes the slave of the lender. Isn't health insurance in a very practical sense the creation of debt - both because we commit to the payment of the costs of the coverage (premiums and deductibles, copays, fees) and because we are pre-paying for a surety against future debt. Are we then slaves to the insurer and, possibly, the employer?
3. Then there is Revelation 9:21 which warns us of the evil of "pharmakea" - drugs - termed in some translations as "sorceries". Modern medicine is very much a practice of sorcery using chemical compounds as magic potions. If you have health insurance, this is the predominant treatment option you will have.
4. The issue of faith. Do you trust Yahweh or will you make your own provision? The letter to Laodicea is very much about this. They had such great substance that they thought they had no need to depend on Yahweh for provision. They became spiritually poor as they ceased to act in faith. If we carry health insurance is that an act of self-reliance and placing our faith in ourselves and other men?
Yashua says we have not because we ask not.
The Scripture says by His stripes we are healed.
Insurance companies are deeply rooted in the world system of materialism and financial manipulation. Insurance is a core business of the worldwide financial order that demands conformity or else be excluded.
If we are to be in the world but not of it, is health insurance one of those deceptions formed by the adversary for the purpose of directing us away from God and strip us of faith and power?
I can't say for certain my family and I have decided in fact to go without insurance and rely totally on Yahweh for health and provision, but we are leaning that way.
Any ideas?
Some are probably already here, by choice or by circumstances, patiently waiting for me to arrive. Well, here I am.
The subject is health insurance. Paying for healthcare is the uppermost topic of conversation all over the nation and has been for the past few months. If you are reading this, it is likely you are familiar with all sides of that debate, and just as likely you are tired of the fight and worried about the outcome.
And that leads to the issue I wish to consider in this article: Is it appropriate for a believer and follower of The Way to purchase health insurance in any form?
Up until a few days ago, there was no doubt in my mind that it was irresponsible and imprudent not to carry health insurance if at all possible financially - especially if I had others to provide for (spouse, children)who depended on my provision and care. Frankly, I don't believe I would have given a suggestion to the contrary a moment's consideration.
Yet, here I am, seriously questioning it.
What happened?
For a number of years I have been researching what is generally called alternative medicine - primarily herbalism and traditional medicine but also including modern concepts which are outside of the mainstream of medical practice yet relatively recent and similarly presented (vitamin therapy, chelation, sound therapy, and the like). An inevitable corrollary of this research is uncovering a great deal of information about the process and problems of contemporary allopathic medicine.
Most insurance will not cover herbal, traditional or any other natural or alternate approach to health and healing. Likewise, most mainstream physicians are ignorant about traditional or alternative therapies - a large percentage reject them outright and it is not uncommon for one to reject or terminate a relationship with a patient who chooses alternative medicine as a supplement to or instead of generally accepted practices.
The same goes for insurance. Patients who refuse to adhere to allopathic methodology can find themselves cancelled, and, in effect, blackballed, uninsurable for choices ranging from refusing vaccines to forgoing chemotherapy.
Insurers dictate to patients which courses of treatment are acceptable and covered by the policy. Deviation from the approved parameters are refused payment.
Fear of accumulating large medical debt forces patients to conform to the system and take what is offered - even if they don't believe in the effectiveness of the treatment.
My questions are derived from this understanding of how the system works:
1. We are told that we are not to be conformed to the world, but to Yashua. If we have health insurance which prevents us from using treatments we think are more effective or requires us to accept measures we know are ineffective or even harmful, aren't we conforming to the world?
2. Believers are not supposed to be in debt because the debtor becomes the slave of the lender. Isn't health insurance in a very practical sense the creation of debt - both because we commit to the payment of the costs of the coverage (premiums and deductibles, copays, fees) and because we are pre-paying for a surety against future debt. Are we then slaves to the insurer and, possibly, the employer?
3. Then there is Revelation 9:21 which warns us of the evil of "pharmakea" - drugs - termed in some translations as "sorceries". Modern medicine is very much a practice of sorcery using chemical compounds as magic potions. If you have health insurance, this is the predominant treatment option you will have.
4. The issue of faith. Do you trust Yahweh or will you make your own provision? The letter to Laodicea is very much about this. They had such great substance that they thought they had no need to depend on Yahweh for provision. They became spiritually poor as they ceased to act in faith. If we carry health insurance is that an act of self-reliance and placing our faith in ourselves and other men?
Yashua says we have not because we ask not.
The Scripture says by His stripes we are healed.
Insurance companies are deeply rooted in the world system of materialism and financial manipulation. Insurance is a core business of the worldwide financial order that demands conformity or else be excluded.
If we are to be in the world but not of it, is health insurance one of those deceptions formed by the adversary for the purpose of directing us away from God and strip us of faith and power?
I can't say for certain my family and I have decided in fact to go without insurance and rely totally on Yahweh for health and provision, but we are leaning that way.
Any ideas?
Saturday, August 22, 2009
Why the Health-care Problem is not with the Insurance Companies
You are limiting the private sector to insurance.
The problem is that insurance is a symptom, not a cause of the current problems and was initially applied as a patch to a perceived problem.By creating a single-payer system, or government/public option, or nationalized health-care (whichever, if any comes to pass) you are once again pasting a patch on a worn package hoping to hold it together a little longer.
If you want to resolve the inefficiencies of the market, the first task is to work back past the results of previous policies and legislation and market disruptions to find where the market began to "fail" and find the root causes.
You will not find the cause here to be market but government.Perceived inequities were used to impose non-market solutions which increasingly distorted and limited market options.
I am certain that by imposing any of the systems mentioned above, you will not remove inequities from the system but rather redistribute the costs and benefits. If the system is actually, practically, egalitarian, then the outcome will be a distribution which results in less than optimal satisfaction for all consumers...and, the black market which will result will create greater inequities than exist now.
If the system is not egalitarian, but distributes services unequally, it will by nature have to use factors other than price to determine that distribution. Such a non-price distribution will inevitably be political and be determined by politicians interests. As such, the benefits and costs will fall on separate populations and be unequally borne or received. The population bearing the costs will then have a disincentive to contribute and will find ways to hide or diminish taxable resources. The beneficiaries will have an incentive to increase their use and grow the cost in proportion. As revenues decrease, demands increase, the government will be forced to expand the tax base, ration care, or remove health care from any private market and nationalize it, nominally providing it for free, but in fact disguising the cost by alternate funding or inflation.
The problem is that insurance is a symptom, not a cause of the current problems and was initially applied as a patch to a perceived problem.By creating a single-payer system, or government/public option, or nationalized health-care (whichever, if any comes to pass) you are once again pasting a patch on a worn package hoping to hold it together a little longer.
If you want to resolve the inefficiencies of the market, the first task is to work back past the results of previous policies and legislation and market disruptions to find where the market began to "fail" and find the root causes.
You will not find the cause here to be market but government.Perceived inequities were used to impose non-market solutions which increasingly distorted and limited market options.
I am certain that by imposing any of the systems mentioned above, you will not remove inequities from the system but rather redistribute the costs and benefits. If the system is actually, practically, egalitarian, then the outcome will be a distribution which results in less than optimal satisfaction for all consumers...and, the black market which will result will create greater inequities than exist now.
If the system is not egalitarian, but distributes services unequally, it will by nature have to use factors other than price to determine that distribution. Such a non-price distribution will inevitably be political and be determined by politicians interests. As such, the benefits and costs will fall on separate populations and be unequally borne or received. The population bearing the costs will then have a disincentive to contribute and will find ways to hide or diminish taxable resources. The beneficiaries will have an incentive to increase their use and grow the cost in proportion. As revenues decrease, demands increase, the government will be forced to expand the tax base, ration care, or remove health care from any private market and nationalize it, nominally providing it for free, but in fact disguising the cost by alternate funding or inflation.
Labels:
federal government,
healthcare reform,
obama,
socialism
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